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Using a dataset covering over 10,000 Australian primary school teachers and over 
90,000 pupils, I estimate how effective teachers are in raising students’ test scores 
from one exam to the next. Since the exams are conducted only every two years, it is 
necessary to take account of the teacher’s work in the intervening year. Even after 
adjusting for measurement error, the resulting teacher fixed effects are widely 
dispersed across teachers, and there is a strong positive correlation between a 
teacher’s gains in literacy and numeracy. Teacher fixed effects show a significant 
association with some, though not all, observable teacher characteristics. Experience 
has the strongest effect, with a large effect in the early years of a teacher’s career. 
Female teachers do better at teaching literacy. Teachers with a master’s degree or 
some other form of further qualification do not appear to achieve significantly larger 
test score gains. Overall, teacher characteristics found in the departmental payroll 
database can explain only a small fraction of the variance in teacher performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In many occupations, it is relatively straightforward to estimate worker productivity. 
Standard proxies for output include billable hours for lawyers, value-added for 
builders, and research output for economists. But for school teachers, measuring 
output is considerably trickier. One commonly used measure of teacher effectiveness 
is expert assessment, in which an outside observer watches a teacher for some period 
of time, and forms a view as to his or her competence. However, since each observer 
only ever has the chance to see a relatively small number of teachers, the observer 
will typically find it difficult to compare the teacher with all other teachers, or to 
separate teacher-specific factors from other factors that may affect student 
achievement. 
 
Given that children’s test scores have been shown to be positively correlated with 
subsequent educational and labor market outcomes, exam results are often used as a 
measure of educational output.
1 Therefore, a natural measure of teacher productivity 
might be thought to be the average test scores of the children in that teacher’s class. 
While this approach allows the use of a common benchmark for all teachers, it suffers 
from the problem that a large portion of the variance in children’s test scores is 
determined by family background rather than by what is learned in schools (see e.g. 
Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, Mood, Weinfeld et al., 1966). 
 
This paper therefore seeks to estimate teacher output (or “teacher effectiveness”) 
using changes in test scores from one test to the next. Implementing such an approach 
requires panel data, in which teachers and students are observed over multiple years. 
Using a fixed effects regression, it is possible to separate student effects and teacher 
effects, and to thereby estimate something akin to the “value-added” of a particular 
teacher.  
 
                                                 
1 Test scores have been shown to be positively correlated with the high school 
graduation rate, future employment prospects, and adult wages (Bishop, 1991; Currie 
& Thomas, 2001; Hanushek & Raymond, 2002; Marks & Fleming, 1998a, 1998b; 
Murnane, Willet, & Levy, 1995).   2
By contrast to approaches that investigate the correlation between student and teacher 
characteristics in a single cross-section, the use of panel data makes it possible to take 
account of the fact that teachers are not randomly assigned to students. This is true 
both across schools (teachers may choose to work at a particular school because of the 
makeup of the student body), and within schools (principals may assign the most 
effective teachers to the most gifted or struggling students). Panel data take account of 
this issue by including a student fixed effect, thereby making it possible to compare 
the performance of the same student under different teachers.  
 
A similar strategy to that implemented in this paper has been carried out in three 
recent US studies. Using data from Texas, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) 
estimated a fixed effects model on a population of over half a million students. Their 
dataset allowed them to identify the school and grade for each teacher and student. 
For schools with only one teacher per grade, this allowed them to match teachers and 
students perfectly, while for other schools, they were able to match groups of teachers 
with groups of students. Rivkin et al. found that differences between teachers 
explained about 15 percent of the measured variance in student test scores. In both 
reading and mathematics, a one standard deviation increase in teacher effectiveness 
led to an increase in student achievement of around one-tenth of a standard deviation. 
The authors also explored the impact of qualifications and turnover, concluding that 
teacher qualifications explained little of the variance in teacher effectiveness, and that 
those teachers who left the profession were not substantially different from those who 
remained.  
 
Similar research by Rockoff (2004) used data from two school districts in New Jersey. 
While Rockoff’s sample comprised only about 10,000 students, his study had the 
advantage that he was able to precisely match students to teachers. Rockoff found 
significant variation in teacher effectiveness, with a point estimate similar to Rivkin et 
al.: moving one standard deviation up the distribution of teacher fixed effects raised 
students’ reading and mathematics test scores by about one-tenth of a standard 
deviation on the national scale. At the high school level, a study by Aaronson, 
Barrow, and Sander (2007), using data from Chicago, found that a one standard 
deviation increase in mathematics teacher effectiveness over a full year raised student 
test scores by 0.15 standard deviations.   3
 
Outside the United States, relatively little research has been carried out on the 
measurement of teacher effectiveness.
2 One of the main challenges is that 
standardized tests are often not administered annually. For example, elementary 
school pupils are typically tested in grades 3, 5, and 7 in Australia, ages 7 and 10 in 
Ireland, grades 2 and 5 in Italy, and ages 10 and 12 in Singapore (O’Donnell & 
Sargent, 2008).  Estimating teacher fixed effects models when tests are not 
administered annually is therefore of considerable policy relevance. 
 
Focusing on teacher effectiveness in the Australian context is also interesting for other 
reasons. The teaching profession is more regulated than in the United States, with a 
higher unionization rate, and uniformity in public school teacher salary schedules 
across entire states and territories (not just across school districts).
3 Moreover, 
Australia can be regarded as a relatively low-accountability environment, since at the 
time when the data in this study were collected, test scores were not publicly reported 
at a school level. 
 
This paper uses data from the state of Queensland, Australia, where standardized tests 
are conducted every two years. With over 90,000 primary school pupils in grades 3 to 
7 between 2001 and 2004, it is possible to estimate the teacher fixed effects for over 
10,000 teachers. To preview the results, I find that the teacher fixed effects are jointly 
                                                 
2 In Australia, the closest study to this one is Hill and Rowe (1996), who use data 
from 13,700 Victorian primary and secondary school children to estimate the fraction 
of test score variance within classes and within schools. They conclude that variance 
at the class/teacher level constitutes 37-54 percent of measured variance, while 
school-level variance constitutes just 4-8 percent of total variance. A similar study 
focusing on year 12 students found that class/teacher effects consistently accounted 
for 59 percent of the residual variance in student achievement, compared with 5 
percent at the school level (Rowe, 2000; Rowe, Turner, & Lane, 1999, 2002). Yet a 
significant drawback of these studies (unavoidable given the data available to the 
researchers) is that they are unable to take account of the non-random allocation of 
students across schools and teachers across classrooms. As a result, one cannot know 
whether classroom-level variance is high because there are substantial differences in 
teacher quality, or because classroom-level shocks are large. 
3 It is difficult to obtain comparable unionization rates at a fine occupation level, but 
in 2008 the unionization rate for US workers in ‘Education, Training, and Library 
Occupations’ was 43 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics), while the unionization rate 
for Australian ‘Education Professionals’ was 55 percent (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics).   4
significant, and highly dispersed. Moving from a teacher at the 25th percentile to a 
teacher at the 75th percentile would raise test scores by one-seventh of a standard 
deviation. I find that teacher experience is positively correlated with teacher 
effectiveness, but find no positive effects of teacher qualifications on test scores. 
Female teachers do better at teaching literacy. Overall, however, these factors account 
for less than one-hundredth of the variation between teachers. Most of the differences 
between teachers are due to factors not captured in the payroll database. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
methodology and estimates a teacher fixed effects model. Section 3 analyzes the 
teacher fixed effect terms to see how much of the variation between teachers can be 
explained by qualifications and demographic characteristics. The final section 
concludes.  
 
2. Estimating Teacher Fixed Effects With Biennial Tests 
 
This study uses de-identified microdata for primary school students between grades 3 
and 7 who attended government schools in the state of Queensland during the years 
2001-2004.
4  The Queensland Department of Education, Training and the Arts 
(DETA) administers standardized literacy and numeracy tests to all pupils in grades 3, 
5, and 7. Since the focus is on differences from one test to the next, I restrict the 
sample to students who completed two tests. Due to data problems with one cohort, 
the final sample consists of three cohorts of students, depicted in Table 1.
5  
 
                                                 
4 The dataset that I have been supplied by DETA does not include any student 
demographic characteristics.  
5 The test scores provided by DETA for students who took the grade 7 test in 2004 
were missing education department identifier codes.   5
 
Table 1: Cohorts Used in the Study  
Test years marked in italics. 
Year  Cohort 1  Cohort 2  Cohort 3 
2001  Grade 3    Grade 5 
2002  Grade 4  Grade 3  Grade 6 
2003  Grade 5  Grade 4  Grade 7 
2004    Grade 5  
Sample Size       
 Literacy  test  29,686 30,371 29,745 
 Numeracy  test  29,926 30,588  30,035 
 
 
In order to estimate the relationship between teacher characteristics and changes in 
student test scores, it is necessary to match data from four different files. 
(i)  Using a dataset of test scores, I use education department student identifier 
codes and school codes (plus students’ birth dates as a cross-check) to match 
students’ performance in one test with their performance in the test taken two 
years later. 
(ii)  Using a dataset of student assignments to roll classes, I use education 
department student identifier codes and students’ birth dates to match students 
to a particular classroom in each of the three years that they appear in the 
sample. 
(iii)  Using a dataset of teacher assignments to roll classes, I use roll class 
identifiers and school codes to match teachers to classrooms. 
(iv)  Using a dataset of teacher payroll information, I use teacher payroll identifiers 
to match teachers to their age, experience, qualifications, and gender.  
 
Because some students move between grades, are absent on the day of the test, or 
have their birthdates miscoded in the dataset, I am only able to make an exact match 
for about three-quarters of students in the sample. From an initial cohort of around 
40,000, the sample sizes in Table 1 are around 30,000.  
 
The timing of tests in Australia also introduces complications. Previous papers that 
estimate teacher fixed effect models (such as Rivkin et al., 2005 and Rockoff, 2004) 
use data from elementary school exams that are administered annually, at the end of   6
the school year. As a result, any change from one test to the next can be attributed to 
only one teacher (assuming no teacher turnover during the year).  
 
By contrast, Queensland (like other Australian states and territories) administers its 
statewide standardized test biennially. Thus the question arises of how teachers in the 
intervening year should be treated. The two most plausible approaches are: (a) ignore 
the intervening year altogether, or (b) create an assumed test score in the intervening 
year, which lies at the midpoint of the other two tests. In this section, I present both 
methods, the results of which turn out to be quite similar. To maximize sample size, I 
therefore use the interpolation method in the following section.  
 
A second complication is that tests are administered just after the middle of the school 
year (the school year runs from January to December, and the tests are administered 
in August). In the case of a child who takes tests in the middle of grade 3 and the 
middle of grade 5, it is therefore possible that the grade 3 teacher contributes to both 
tests. Under most plausible assumptions, this will introduce only attenuation bias into 
estimates of the teacher fixed effects terms. To the extent that teachers focus their 
attention on the test administered in their year, or the test is based on material taught 
in that grade and the preceding grade, the attenuation bias introduced by using mid-
year tests will be smaller than otherwise. 
 
I use the results of 12 tests – literacy and numeracy exams administered to three 
cohorts of students at two grade levels.
6 Although the tests are scaled so as to be 
comparable over time and across grades, I standardize each of the tests to a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of unity.
7 Thus the average student has a test score of 
                                                 
6 Students typically have the same teacher for all subjects. There is no formal system 
for tracking students by ability across schools at this age. Within schools, principals 
have discretion over the way in which students and teacher are allocated to classes. In 
practice, the degree of streaming is relatively small, but the combination of non-
random sorting of students across classes and mean-reversion could in principle bias 
the teacher fixed effects. To address this, I also re-estimate fixed effects at the 
grade×year×school level, and regress these on the mean characteristics of all teachers 
in that grade-year-school cell. This strategy produces quite similar results to those 
shown in Tables 5 and 6.  
7 Such a rescaling has two advantages. First, it makes the coefficients more readily 
interpretable. Second, it avoids the problem that the dispersion of test scores tends to 
change systematically across grades (falling for literacy, and rising for numeracy).   7
zero, and the average change in the relative distribution of student test scores is zero. 
Naturally, this does not mean that the average student learns nothing between tests, 
but that the average student’s relative position in the distribution remains unchanged 
between tests. A student who is 0.5 standard deviations above the mean is performing 
at about the same level as the typical child in the next grade.
8  
 
The full model, the results of which are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, is: 
 
Yijgt = Tj + Cjgt + Ψgt + Πi + εijgt         ( 1 )  
 
Yijgt is the literacy or numeracy test score of individual i, taught by teacher j, in grade 
g, and calendar year t, which is modeled as a function of teacher fixed effects Tj, class 
size Cjgt, grade×calendar year fixed effects Ψgt, student fixed effects Πi, and a 
normally distributed error term εijgt.
9 In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, I also show the 
results omitting the student fixed effects. Omitting the class-size control or the 
grade×calendar year fixed effects (or both) has virtually no impact on the results. 
 
An important advantage of this methodology is that the inclusion of student fixed 
effects means that the results are estimated not from students’ performance in a single 
test, but on the change in student performance over two successive tests. This helps to 
deal with one of the most common criticisms of exams as a measure of school 
performance: that differences between students are determined primarily by children’s 
home environment, rather than what they learn in the classroom.
10  
                                                                                                                                            
Re-estimating the results using the raw scores makes no substantive difference to the 
results. 
8 This calculation uses the fact that the original scores are designed to be comparable 
across grades and years. In literacy, a student must score 0.57 standard deviations 
above the mean to be equivalent to a child in the next grade. In numeracy, a student 
must score 0.48 standard deviations above the mean to be equivalent to a child in the 
next grade. 
9 Because I only observe each student and each teacher at a single school, the model 
does not include school fixed effects. 
10 It is possible that a student’s home background affects not only the level of her 
scores, but also her gain from one test to the next. Whether students at the bottom of 
the distribution tend to have larger or smaller gains than those at the top of the 
distribution will depend primarily on the way in which the test is scaled. Ideally, one 
might wish to include two student fixed effects – one for the level, and another for the   8
 
Setting the standard deviation of the student test score distribution to one gives the 
teacher fixed effects a straightforward interpretation. For example, a teacher with a 
fixed effect of one raises her students’ test scores on average by one standard 
deviation, relative to all other teachers. Naturally, because the average change in 
student test scores is zero, the average teacher fixed effect is also zero (i.e. students of 
the average teacher maintain their position in the relative student test score 
distribution). 
 
The results of the student-level regression are shown in Table 2. Columns 1 and 2 
show the results without student fixed effects, while columns 3 and 4 show the 
(preferred) specification with student fixed effects.
 11 In each specification, an F-test 
strongly rejects the hypothesis that the teacher fixed effects terms are jointly equal to 
zero. This is true whether the analysis omits non-test years (Panel A) or linearly 
interpolates test scores in non-test years (Panel B). In each case, I can easily reject the 
null hypothesis that there are no systematic differences between teachers.  
 
The coefficients on class size (not reported) tend to be negative for the numeracy tests 
and positive for the literacy tests. Although the class size coefficients are statistically 
significant in some specifications, it would be unwise to draw any causal inference 
from this, given the possibility of non-random sorting of students across differently 
sized classes.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
gain. However, the data provided to me by DETA contains only two observations per 
student, which makes it possible to include only a level fixed effect for each student.  
11 Computationally, the student fixed effects are estimated by de-meaning the data, 
since at the time of writing, I was unable to obtain sufficient computing power to run 
a regression with this many fixed effects. For a detailed discussion of the various 
approaches used to estimate fixed effects models in the presence of computational 
constraints, see Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). For Stata users with smaller 
samples or larger computers, the two-way fixed effects routine outlined in Cornelissen 
(2008) may be useful.   9
 
Table 2: Estimating teacher fixed effects from panel data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Panel A: Dropping Non-Test Years
F-test for joint significance of 
teacher fixed effect terms  4.89***  5.82***  2.92***  4.08*** 
Teacher  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Student fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Class  size  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Grade×Calendar Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  (students×years)  180116 181621 180116 181621 
Number of students  90840  91606  90840  91606 
Number of teachers  9226  9233  9226  9233 
Number of schools  1057  1058  1057  1058 
Panel B: Interpolating Non-Test Years 
F-test for joint significance of 
teacher fixed effect terms  5.48***  6.36***  3.02***  4.19*** 
Teacher  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Student fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Class  size  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Grade×Calendar Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  (students×years)  268165 270391 268165 270391 
Number of students  90847  91613  90847  91613 
Number of teachers 11240  11249  11240  11249 
Number of schools  1057  1058  1057  1058 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Standard errors in brackets. In Panel B, grade 4 students are assigned the average of their grade 3 and 5 
tests; and grade 6 students are assigned the average of their grade 5 and 7 tests. 
 
 
Not surprisingly, the teacher fixed effects for literacy and numeracy are highly 
correlated. Estimating the teacher fixed effects using the approach in Table 2, Panel 
B, columns 3-4, and weighting teachers by the inverse of the standard error of their 
fixed effect, the correlation between teacher fixed effects for literacy and numeracy is 
0.37.
12 Figure 1 shows a plot of the two fixed effects for each teacher in the sample. 
For the most part, teachers whose pupils have above-average numeracy gains also 
have above-average literacy gains; while teachers whose pupils have below-average 
numeracy gains also have below-average literacy gains. 
 
                                                 
12 The standard errors for the teacher fixed effects are estimated in Stata using the fese 





































Average change in literacy (SD)
Numeracy fixed effect = 0.004 + 0.388 * Literacy fixed effect (t=40.5)
Each dot represents one teacher
Figure 1: Are Good Numeracy Teachers
Also Good Literacy Teachers?
 
The dispersion of the teacher fixed effects terms provides a measure of the dispersion 
of teacher performance across Queensland primary schools. However, because the 
teacher fixed effects are measured with error, the observed variance of the teacher 
fixed effects terms will be larger than the true variance across teachers. As noted in 
McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, and Hamilton (2003), if we are interested in the 
optimal estimate for individual teachers, we should use the estimated fixed effects. 
However, if we are interested in the degree of dispersion, it is necessary to shrink the 
variance of the fixed effects to account for sampling error.  
 
There are various ways of shrinking the variance.
13 Following Rockoff (2004), I use 
an empirical Bayes technique employed in the meta-analysis literature, which 
assumes the teacher fixed effects are normally distributed, and models the observed 
variance of the fixed effects terms as an additive function of some true variance, plus 
sampling error. In practice, this is done using the iterative technique outlined in 
Thompson and Sharp (1999), in which the true variance is estimated as a function of 
                                                 
13 Another common technique for shrinking the variance is to estimate separate 
teacher fixed effects for each year, and extract the persistent portion of each teacher’s 
fixed effect (see e.g. Kane & Staiger, 2008). However, such an approach involves 
discarding teachers who are only observed once, which is undesirable in a short panel.     11
the observed teacher effects and their standard errors.
14 The unadjusted and adjusted 
standard deviations of the teacher fixed effects terms are set out in Table 3. Using the 
shrinkage estimator, the standard deviation on the teacher fixed effects terms falls to 
around 0.13-0.15 when non-test years are dropped, and to around 0.10-0.12 when 
non-test years are interpolated.
15 This indicates a very similar level of dispersion 
across teachers in Queensland primary schools as has been observed across schools in 
New Jersey and Texas. 
 
Table 3: Standard Deviation of Teacher Fixed Effect Terms 
 Unadjusted  Adjusted 
Panel A: Dropping Non-Test Years
Literacy 0.194  0.126 
Numeracy 0.200  0.146 
Panel B: Interpolating Non-Test Years 
Literacy 0.156  0.101 
Numeracy 0.160  0.116 
 
Note that even adjusting the dispersion for sampling error, there is a wide distribution 
of teacher fixed effects. Even the most conservative estimate in Table 3 suggests that 
the adjusted standard deviation of teacher fixed effects is 0.1. This implies that 
moving from a teacher at the 25th percentile to a teacher at the 75th percentile would 
raise test scores by one-seventh of a standard deviation. Recalling that a 0.5 standard 
deviation increase in test scores is equivalent to a full year’s learning, this implies that 
a 75th percentile teacher can achieve in three-quarters of a year what a 25th percentile 
teacher can achieve in a full year.  
 
Moving from a teacher at the 10th percentile to a teacher at the 90th percentile would 
have even more dramatic effects, raising test scores by one quarter of a standard 
                                                 
14 Let tj be the estimated teacher effect of teacher j, and σj be the standard error of that 
effect. Where t is the mean of the teacher effects (zero by construction), and T is the 
number of teachers in the sample, I estimate the true variance τ
2 as 
() () ( ) () ∑ ∑ − − − =
− − 2 2 1 * 1 * 2 1 j j j j t t T T w w σ τ . In the first iteration, 
2 * − = j j w σ . In 
subsequent iterations,  ()
1 2 2 * −
+ = j j w σ τ . The process is repeated until successive 
iterations of τ
2 differ by less than 0.0001. 
15 Another approach is to simultaneously estimate current teacher and lagged teacher 
effects. The dispersion in teacher effectiveness with this approach is very similar to 
that shown in Table 3.   12
deviation. This implies that a teacher at the 90th percentile can achieve in half a year 
what a teacher at the 10th percentile can achieve in a full year.  
 
To make the above examples more concrete, note that the most disadvantaged racial 
group in Australia are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (Indigenous 
Australians). In grades 5 and 7, the test score gap between Indigenous students and 
Non-Indigenous students in Queensland is approximately three-quarters of a standard 
deviation (Bradley, Draca, Green, & Leeves,  2007; see also Leigh & Gong, 2009). 
This implies that Indigenous students perform approximately 1½ grades below their 
non-Indigenous counterparts. Assuming that the impact of having a more effective 
teacher persists over time, and that Indigenous children typically get teachers at the 
25th percentile, these results imply that the black-white test score gap in Australia 
could be closed in five years by giving all Indigenous pupils teachers at the 75th 
percentile. 
 
3. Can Teacher Demographics Explain the Variation in Teacher Effectiveness? 
 
Having derived a teacher fixed effect for each teacher in the sample, it is possible to 
ask the question: how much of the variation between teachers can be explained by 
characteristics such as gender, age, experience, and qualifications? This question has 
important policy ramifications, since the uniform salary schedules that operate in 
Australian public schools are based exclusively on experience and qualifications. To 
the extent that these factors are good proxies for productivity, such a system will 
appropriately remunerate the teaching workforce. However, if experience and 
qualifications do not explain a large portion of the variation between teachers, this 
suggests that the uniform salary schedules may be overly rigid. 
 
Table 4 sets out the characteristics of the 10,398 teachers in the sample (for this part 
of the paper, I drop teachers with missing demographics or fixed effects). Around 10 
percent have a master’s degree or some further qualification.
16 The share of teachers 
                                                 
16 Since the 1980s, registered teachers in Queensland public schools have been 
required to complete at least 4 years of tertiary training. This category covers those 
who have done more than the minimum requirement to be registered, such as an 
honors degree, a master’s degree, a doctorate, or a second degree.   13
who are female is 77 percent, the average age is 40, and the average number of years 
of experience is 14.  
 
The DETA also provides a “suitability rating” for 6,194 teachers, or about two-thirds 
of the sample.
17 This rating is determined by an assessment panel that comprises at 
least two people, including a teacher and a principal. The panel makes their rating 
decision based upon an interview, during which the candidate makes a 10-minute 
presentation about their professional experience and their ability to prepare and 
implement lessons. The interviewee then answers questions for 20-30 minutes. In the 
case of applicants who have just completed a teaching practicum at a government 
school, classroom observation of their performance will also be taken into account. 
Teachers can request a reassessment, though this may result in a rise or fall in their 
rating.  
 
Teachers receive a rating of S1 (“outstanding applicants”), S2 (“quality applicants”), 
S3 (“satisfactory applicants”), or S4 (“eligible for temporary/casual employment”).
18 
The purpose of the rating is so that teachers can be allocated to positions on merit. 
Although a rating in the top category is not a prerequisite to teach, the official 
document describing the ratings process stated that “an S1 applicant will be made an 
offer of employment before an S2 applicant with similar location preferences and 
teaching areas” (Education Queensland, 2004, 11). Across the sample, 72 percent of 
teachers were rated in the top category, 18 percent were in the second-highest 
category, and 10 percent were in the third-highest category. Only one teacher in the 
sample received a rating in the lowest category, so I combine categories 3 and 4.  
 
 
                                                 
17 The suitability rating described here was in place in Queensland from 1998 to 2008, 
after which the four-point scale was replaced with a six-point scale (presumably in an 
effort to achieve greater dispersion of ratings). 
18 Teachers who have not yet been rated are given a suitability rating of “T4”. Since 
this does not reflect the department’s assessment of their competence, I code it as 
missing.   14
 
 
Table 4: Unweighted Summary Statistics for Teacher Characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev.
Masters Degree or Other 
Further Qualification 
10398 0.100 0.300
Female 10398 0.773 0.419
Age 10398 40.125 10.458
Experience 10398 13.527 11.055
DETA Rating=1  6194 0.724 0.447
DETA Rating=2  6194 0.180 0.384
DETA Rating=3 or 4  6194 0.097 0.295
 
In Table 5, I show the results of regressing the teacher fixed effects on various 
observable characteristics that are in the DETA payroll database. Panel A shows the 
results using the teacher fixed effects based on changes in literacy scores, while Panel 
B uses teacher fixed effects based on changes in numeracy scores.  
 
Before discussing the particular coefficients, it is worth noting that while several 
teacher characteristics are systematically related to teacher fixed effects, very little of 
the variance between teachers can be explained by the factors in the DETA payroll 
database. As the results in Tables 3 and 4 show, there are large gaps between teachers. 
However, as the R-squared statistics in Tables 5 and 6 indicate, the combination of 
qualifications, gender, age, experience, and the DETA ratings explain less than 1 
percent of the variation between teachers.  
 
For both literacy and numeracy, I find that teachers with a masters degree or some 
other further qualification obtain lower test score gains than teachers without these 
additional qualifications. This effect is statistically significant with or without 
additional demographic controls. The absence of a positive effect of teacher 
qualifications on teacher performance is consistent with US studies (Rivkin et al., 
2005 and Rockoff, 2004), which also find no positive impact of having a master’s 
degree. However, it should be noted that my estimates – and those from the US – are 
based upon comparing those teachers who chose to obtain master’s degrees with those 
who did not. It is entirely plausible that master’s degrees have a positive impact on 
student test score gains, but that there is some negative selection into master’s 
programs. A preferable estimation strategy would be to observe teachers before and 
after they obtain a master’s degree; but this is not feasible with the present dataset.    15
 
There appears to be a statistically significant effect of teacher gender on student test 
score gain. In particular, female teachers have larger test score gains in literacy, a 
result that is robust to controlling for age, experience, and qualifications. In numeracy, 
the female coefficient is negative, but insignificant in the presence of other controls 
and small in magnitude.  
 
Age and experience are positively related to student test score gains. In the literacy 
specification, including both age and experience causes the experience coefficient to 
become statistically insignificant. In the numeracy specification, the effects of age and 
experience are larger in magnitude than in the literacy specification, and the effects 
remain statistically significant when both are included in the regression.  
 
Note that with only a short panel, I am unable to separate cohort effects from age 
effects. In the present situation, this may be important, given that the academic 
aptitude of new teachers in Australia was significantly lower in the early 2000s than 
in the early 1980s (Leigh & Ryan, 2008). Assuming a teacher’s academic aptitude is 
positively correlated with his or her teacher fixed effect, this secular decline in teacher 
aptitude will cause an upward bias in the age coefficient. 
   16
 
 
Table 5: Student Test Score Gain and Teacher Characteristics 
Dependent Variable is the teacher fixed effect
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Literacy
Masters -0.0101**       -0.0079* 
  [0.0040]      [0.0040] 
Female   0.0140***    0.0153*** 
   [0.0026]    [0.0027] 
Age     0.0004***   0.0003* 
     [0.0001]  [0.0002] 
Experience      0.0004***  0.0002 
      [0.0001]  [0.0002] 
R-squared  0.0006  0.0022  0.0012 0.001 0.0043 
Teachers  10398 10398 10398 10398 10398 
Panel B: Numeracy
Masters -0.0125***       -0.0083** 
  [0.0040]      [0.0041] 
Female   -0.0050*     -0.0021 
   [0.0028]    [0.0029] 
Age     0.0009***   0.0004** 
     [0.0001]  [0.0002] 
Experience      0.0009***  0.0005*** 
      [0.0001]  [0.0002] 
R-squared  0.0008 0.0003 0.0049 0.0055 0.0064 
Teachers  10398 10398 10398 10398 10398 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. Each observation is a teacher fixed effect (derived from the specifications 





In Table 6, I estimate the effect of the DETA rating, which is available for about two-
thirds of the teachers in the sample. By comparison with teachers rated 3 or 4 (the two 
lowest ratings), teacher rated 1 or 2 produce higher test score gains. The positive 
relationship between the DETA rating and value-added is slightly larger for literacy 
than for numeracy. Controlling for gender, qualifications, age, and experience, the 
relationship between value-added and the DETA ranking is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level for literacy and the 10 percent level for numeracy.  




Table 6: Student Test Score Gain and Education Department Ratings 
Dependent Variable is the teacher fixed effect
  (1) (2) 
  Panel A: Literacy 
Rating=1 0.0087*  0.0149*** 
 [0.0051]  [0.0053] 
Rating=2 0.0057  0.0104* 
 [0.0061]  [0.0062] 
Masters   -0.0051 
   [0.0047] 
Female   0.0078** 
   [0.0039] 
Age   0.0001 
   [0.0002] 
Experience   0.0007*** 
   [0.0003] 
R-squared 0.0004  0.0035 
Teachers 6194  6194 
  Panel B: Numeracy 
Rating=1 0.0023  0.0114* 
 [0.0056]  [0.0060] 
Rating=2 0.0055  0.0111 
 [0.0067]  [0.0068] 
Masters   -0.0032 
   [0.0049] 
Female   -0.0078* 
   [0.0040] 
Age   0.0004** 
   [0.0002] 
Experience   0.0008*** 
   [0.0003] 
R-squared 0.0001  0.0048 
Teachers 6194  6194 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. Each observation is a teacher fixed effect (derived from the specifications 
set out in Table 2). Estimates are weighted by the inverse of the standard error on each teacher’s fixed 
effect. The DETA rating ranges from 1 to 4, with 3-4 being the excluded category from the regressions 




Since Tables 5 and 6 only include experience as a linear term, Figures 2 and 3 test 
whether there is a nonlinear relationship between experience and student test score 
gain. Both charts are based upon a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of   18




For both literacy and numeracy, there appears to be a statistically significant effect of 
experience in the early years. Compared to novice teachers, teachers with 20 years of 
experience have test score gains that are 0.1 standard deviations higher in literacy, and 
0.2 standard deviations higher in numeracy. Beyond 20 years, there appear to be no 
further gains to experience (indeed, there is some suggestion of a drop in value-added 
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Figure 2: Literacy and Teacher Experience
 
                                                 
19 I use an epanechnikov kernel, with a polynomial of degree zero (i.e. local-mean 
smoothing), and the default bandwidth (3.6 for literacy and 2.4 for numeracy). As 
with the results in Tables 5 and 6, estimates are weighted by the inverse of the 
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This paper has shown how to estimate a measure of teacher performance by using 
panel data with two test scores per student; parsing out the effects of family 
background by including student fixed effects. Rather than looking at which teachers 
have students that are at the top or bottom of the distribution, this approach effectively 
asks which teachers have students who moved up or down the distribution from one 
test to the next.  
 
So far as I am aware, this is the first paper outside the United States to implement this 
empirical strategy, and the first to estimate a teacher fixed effects model using 
biennial data. While US tests are conducted annually (making them readily usable for 
estimating teacher fixed effects models), Australian tests are conducted only every 
second school year. However, this paper demonstrates that this is not an 
insurmountable obstacle, and that by either dropping teachers in the middle year, or 
interpolating test scores in intervening years, it is possible to observe the effects of 
teachers on student test score gains. 
   20
The differences between the best and worst teachers in Queensland are considerable. 
After adjusting for measurement error in estimating the teacher fixed effects terms, I 
find that the standard deviation of teacher fixed effects is around 0.1, similar to 
estimates from other studies in the United States. This suggests that moving from a 
teacher at the 25th percentile to a teacher at the 75th percentile would raise test scores 
by one-seventh of a standard deviation. In terms of literacy and numeracy test scores, 
a 75th percentile teacher can achieve in three-quarters of a year what a 25th percentile 
teacher can achieve in a full year; while a 90th percentile teacher can achieve in half a 
year what a 10th percentile teacher can achieve in a full year. 
 
Unfortunately, while it is possible to draw conclusions about the differences in 
effectiveness between teachers, there is little evidence on the cost of policies to 
improve teacher quality (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006). However, it is possible that 
raising teacher quality may be at least as cost-effective as reducing class sizes. An oft-
cited upper bound of the effects of class size reductions on test scores is Krueger 
(1999), whose estimates suggest that reducing class sizes by one-sixth would boost 
test scores by 0.11 standard deviations. It is not unreasonable to think that an 
equivalent expenditure – a one-sixth increase in teacher salaries – might lead to a one 
standard deviation increase in teacher effectiveness (raising the average teacher to 
what is now the 84th percentile), thus producing an equivalently large increase in 
student achievement.
20  The comparison would favor teacher quality still more if the 
benefits of class size reductions are smaller than the estimates of Krueger (1999) (e.g. 
Hoxby (2000) and Hanushek (1998) find zero or negligible benefits of across-the-
board class size reductions); or if large-scale class-size reductions have the effect of 
lowering teacher quality in disadvantaged schools (see e.g. Jepsen & Rivkin, 2009).  
 
The results from this paper also shed light on the extent to which uniform pay 
schedules, which reward teachers based solely upon qualifications and experience, 
capture productivity differences between teachers. It is certainly true that some of the 
variation between teachers can be explained by demographic factors. In both literacy 
                                                 
20 For example, using panel data on starting teacher salaries across Australian states 
and territories, Leigh (2009) finds that a 1 percent rise in the salary of a starting 
teacher boosts the average aptitude of the future teaching pool (students entering 
teacher education courses) by 0.6 percentile ranks.   21
and numeracy, more experienced teachers have higher test score gains (with the 
experience gradient being steeper for numeracy). I find suggestive evidence that 
students with female teachers do better in literacy, but no evidence that students do 
better if their teachers have higher formal qualifications. And the DETA rating does 
seem to capture some differences between teachers, even holding constant other 
characteristics. 
 
Yet while there are some systematic patterns, 99 percent of the variation in teacher 
performance remains unexplained by differences in teacher demographics. This 
suggests that uniform pay schedules are indeed only picking up a small portion of the 
differences in test score gains across teachers. Assuming test score gains are an 
important measure of educational output, these results suggest that it may be worth 
considering alternative salary structures as a means of attracting and retaining the best 
teachers.    
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